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Hey can you help me write short essay in my own words please simple, no plagiarism, turnitinready this professor is very strict. the first paragraph can only be 2 sentences. my say In this essay I will discuss…. and next sentence More specifically, I included my professor short essay he only wants it one page long Heres the article and reference R.B. BRANDT 3 THE MORALITY AND RATIONALITY OF SUICIDE From the point of view of contemporary philosophy, suicide raises the following distinct questions: whether a person who commits suicide (assuming that there is suicide if and only if there is intentional termina- tion of one’s own life) is morally blameworthy, reprehensible, sinful in all circumstances, whether suicide is objectively right or wrong, and in what circumstances it is right or wrong, from a moral point of view; and whether, or in which circumstances, suicide is the best or the rational thing to do from the point of view of the agent’s personal welfare. The moral blameworthiness of suicide In former times the question of whether suicide is sinful was of great in- terest because the answer to it was considered relevant to how the agent would spend eternity. At present the practical issue is not as great, al- though a normal funeral service may be denied a person judged to have committed suicide sinfully. The chief practical issue now seems to be that persons may disapprove of a decedent for having committed suicide, and his friends or relatives may wish to defend his memory against moral charges. The question of whether an act of suicide was sinful or morally blame- worthy is not apt to arise unless it is already believed that the agent 61 62 A HANDBOOK FOR THE STUDY OF SUICIDE morally ought not to have done it: for instance, if he really had very poor reason for doing so, and his act foreseeably had catastrophic conse- quences for his wife and children. But, even if a given suicide is morally wrong, it does not follow that it is morally reprehensible. For, while asserting that a given act of suicide was wrong, we may still think that the act was hardly morally blameworthy or sinful if, say, the agent was in a state of great emotional turmoil at the time. We might then say that, although what he did var wrongla, though a person broke the lay, he- should not be punished because he was not responsible, that is, was tem- porarily insane, did what he did inadvertently, and so on. The foregoing remarks assume that to be morally blameworthy (or sinful) on account of an act is one thing, and for the act to be wrong is another. But, if we say this, what after all does it mean to say that a per- son is morally blameworthy on account of an action? We cannot say there is agreement among philosophers on this matter, but I suggest the following account as being safe from serious objection: “X is morally blameworthy on account of an action A” may be taken to mean “X did A, and X would not have done A had not his character been in some respect below standard; and in view of this it is fitting or justified for X to have some disapproving attitudes including remorse toward himself, and for some other persons Y to have some disapproving attitudes to- ward X and to express them in behavior.” Traditional thought would in- clude God as one of the “other persons” who might have and express dis- approving attitudes. In case the foregoing definition does not seem obviously correct, it is worthwhile pointing out that it is usually thought that an agent is not blameworthy or sinful for an action unless it is a reflection on him; the definition brings this fact out and makes clear why…. If someone charges that a suicide was sinful, we may now properly ask, “What defect of character did it show?” Some writers have claimed that suicide is blameworthy because it is cowardly, and since being cowardly is generally conceded to be a defect of character, if an act of suicide is admitted to be both objectively wrong and also cowardly, the claim to blameworthiness might be warranted in terms of the above defi- nition. Of course, many people would hesitate to call taking one’s own life a cowardly act, and there will certainly be controversy about which 63 THE MORALITY AND RATIONALITY OF SUICIDE acts are cowardly and which are not. But at least we can see part of what has to be done to make a charge of blameworthiness valid. The most interesting question is the general one: which types of sui- cide in general are ones that, even if objectively wrong (in a sense to be explained below), are not sinful or blameworthy? Or, in other words; when is a suicide morally excused even if it is objectively wrong? We can at least identify some types that are morally excusable. 1. Suppose I think I am morally bound to commit suicide because I have a terminal illness and continued medical care will ruin my family financially. Suppose, however, that I am mistaken in this belief, and that suicide in such circumstances is not right. But surely I am not morally blameworthy; for I may be doing, out of a sense of duty to my family, what I would personally prefer not to do and is hard for me to do. What defect of character might my action show? Suicide from a genuine sense of duty is not blameworthy, even when the moral conviction in question is mistaken. 2. Suppose that I commit suicide when I am temporarily of unsound mind, either in the sense of the M’Naghten rule that I do not know that what I am doing is wrong, or of the Durham rule that, owing to a mental defect, I am substantially unable to do what is right. Surely, any suicide in an unsound state of mind is morally excused. 3. Suppose I commit suicide when I could not be said to be tem- porarily of unsound mind, but simply because I am not myself. For in- stance, I may be in an extremely depressed mood. Now a person may be in a very depressed mood, and commit suicide on account of being in that mood, when there is nothing the matter with his character-or, in other words, his character is not in any relevant way below standard. What are other examples of being “not myself,” of emotional states that might be responsible for a person’s committing suicide, and that might render the suicide excusable even if wrong? Being frightened; being dis- traught; being in almost any highly emotional frame of mind (anger, frustration, disappointment in love); perhaps just being terribly fatigued: So there are at least three types of suicide which can be morally ex- cused even if they are objectively wrong. The main point is this: Mr. X may commit suicide and it may be conceded that he ought not to have done so, but it is another step to show that he is sinful, or morally blame- worthy, for having done so. To make out that further point, it must be 64 A HANDBOOK FOR THE STUDY OF SUICIDE 65 THE MORALITY AND RATIONALITY OF SUICIDE shown that his act is attributable to some substandard trait of character. So, Mrs. X after the suicide can concede that her husband ought not to have done what he did, but she can also point out that it is no reflection on his character. The distinction, unfortunately, is often overlooked. St. Thomas Aquinas, who recognizes the distinction in other places, seems blind to it in his discussion of suicide. The moral reasons for and against suicide Persons who say suicide is morally wrong must be asked which of two positions they are affirming: Are they saying that every act of suicide is wrong, everything considered; or are they merely saying that there is always some moral obligation-doubtless of serious weight-not to com- mit suicide, so that very often suicide is wrong, although it is possible that there are countervailing considerations which in particular situations make it right or even a moral duty? It is quite evident that the first posi- tion is absurd; only the second has a chance of being defensible. In order to make clear what is wrong with the first view, we may be- gin with an example. Suppose an army pilot’s single-seater plane goes out of control over a heavily populated area; he has the choice of staying in the plane and bringing it down where it will do little damage but at the cost of certain death for himself, and of bailing out and letting the plane fall where it will, very possibly killing a good many civilians. Suppose he chooses to do the former, and so, by our definition, commits suicide. Does anyone want to say that his action is morally wrong? Even Im- manuel Kant, who opposed suicide in all circumstances, apparently would not wish to say that it is; he would, in fact, judge that this act is not one of suicide, for he says, “It is no suicide to risk one’s life against one’s enemies, and even to sacrifice it, in order to preserve one’s duties toward oneself.”” St. Thomas Aquinas, in his discussion of suicide, may seem to take the position that such an act would be wrong, for he says, “It is altogether unlawful to kill oneself,” admitting as an exception only the case of being under special command of God. But I believe St. Thomas would, in fact, have concluded that the act is right because the basic intention of the pilot was to save the lives of civilians, and whether an act is right or wrong is a matter of basic intention.? In general, we have to admit that there are things with some moral obligation to avoid which, on account of other morally relevant consid- erations, it is sometimes right or even morally obligatory to do. There may be some obligation to tell the truth on every occasion, but surely in many cases the consequences of telling the truth would be so dire that one is obligated to lie. The same goes for promises. There is some moral obligation to do what one has promised (with a few exceptions); but, if one can keep a trivial promise only at serious cost to another person (i.e., keep an appointment only by failing to give aid to someone injured in an accident), it is surely obligatory to break the promise. The most that the moral critic of suicide could hold, then, is that there is some moral obligation not to do what one knows will cause one’s death; but he surely cannot deny that circumstances exist in which there are obligations to do things which, in fact, will result in one’s death. If so, then in principle it would be possible to argue, for instance, that in order to meet my obligation to my family, it might be right for me to take my own life as the only way to avoid catastrophic hospital expenses in a terminal illness. Possibly the main point that critics of suicide on moral grounds would wish to make is that it is never right to take one’s own life for reasons of one’s own personal welfare, of any kind whatso- ever. Some of the arguments used to support the immorality of suicide, however, are so framed that if they were supportable at all, they would prove that suicide is never moral. One well-known type of argument against suicide may be classified as theological. St. Augustine and others urged that the Sixth Commandment (“‘Thou shalt not kill”) prohibits suicide, and that we are bound to obey a divine commandment. To this reasoning one might first reply that it is arbitrary exegesis of the Sixth Commandment to assert that it was. in- tended to prohibit suicide. The second reply is that if there is not some consideration which shows on the merits of the case that suicide is morally wrong, God had no business prohibiting it. It is true that some will object to this point, and I must refer them elsewhere for my detailed comments on the divine-will theory of morality.? Another theological argument with wide support was accepted by John Locke, who wrote: “.:. Men being all the workmanship of one om- nipotent and infinitely wise Maker; all the servants of one sovereign Mas- ter, sent into the world by His order and about His business; they are His property, whose workmanship they are made to last during His, not one another’s pleasure. … Every one . . . is bound to preserve him- self, and not to quit his station wilfully. ..”* And Kant: “We have 66 A HANDBOOK FOR THE STUDY OF SUICIDE been placed in this world under certain conditions and for specific pur- poses. But a suicide opposes the purpose of his Creator; he arrives in the other world as one who has deserted his post; he must be looked upon as a rebel against God. So long as we remember the truth that it is God’s intention to preserve life, we are bound to regulate our activities in con- formity with it. This duty is upon us until the time comes when God ex- pressly commands us to leave this life. Human beings are sentinels on earth and may not leave their posts until relieved by another beneficent hand.”” Unfortunately, however, even if we grant that it is the duty of human beings to do what God commands or intends them to do, more argument is required to show that God does not permit human beings to quit this life when their own personal welfare would be maximized by so doing. How does one draw the requisite inference about the intentions of God? The difficulties and contradictions in arguments to reach such a conclusion are discussed at length and perspicaciously by David Hume in his essay “On Suicide,” and in view of the unlikelihood that readers will need to be persuaded about these, I shall merely refer those interested to that essay. A second group of arguments may be classed as arguments from nat- ural law. St. Thomas says: “It is altogether unlawful to kill oneself, for three reasons. First, because everything naturally loves itself, the result being that everything naturally keeps itself in being, and resists corrup- tions so far as it can. Wherefore suicide is contrary to the inclination of nature, and to charity whereby every man should love himself. Hence suicide is always a mortal sin, as being contrary to the natural law and to charity.”” Here St. Thomas ignores two obvious points. First, it is not obvious why a human being is morally bound to do what he or she has some inclination to do. (St. Thomas did not criticize chastity.) Second, while it is true that most human beings do feel a strong urge to live, the human being who commits suicide obviously feels a stronger inclination to do something else. It is as natural for a human being to dislike, and to take steps to avoid, say, great pain, as it is to cling to life. A somewhat similar argument by Immanuel Kant may seem better. In a famous passage Kant writes that the maxim of a person who commits suicide is “From self-love I make it my principle to shorten my life if its continuance threatens more evil than it promises pleasure. The only fur- ther question to ask is whether this principle of self-love can become a universal law of nature. It is then seen at once that a system of nature by 67 THE MORALITY AND RATIONALITY OF SUICIDE whose law the very same feeling whose function is to stimulate the fur- therance of life should actually destroy life would contradict itself and consequently could not subsist as a system of nature. Hence this maxim cannot possibly hold as a universal law of nature and is therefore entirely opposed to the supreme principle of all duty.” What Kant finds contra- dictory is that the motive of self-love (interest in one’s own long-range welfare) should sometimes lead one to struggle to preserve one’s life, but at other times to end it. But where is the contradiction? One’s circum- stances change, and, if the argument of the following section in this chap- ter is correct, one sometimes maximizes one’s own long-range welfare by trying to stay alive, but at other times by bringing about one’s demise. A third group of arguments, a form of which goes back at least to Aristotle, has a more modern and convincing ring. These are arguments to show that, in one way or another, a suicide necessarily does harm to other persons, or to society at large. Aristotle says that the suicide treats the state unjustly? Partly following Aristotle, St. Thomas says: “Every man is part of the community, and so, as such, he belongs to the com- munity. Hence by killing himself he injures the community. “1 Blackstone held that a suicide is an offense against the king “who hath an interest in the preservation of all his subjects,” perhaps following Judge Brown in 1563, who argued that suicide cost the king a subject-“he being the head has lost one of his mystical members. “I The premise of such arguments is, as Hume pointed out, obviously mistaken in many instances. It is true that Freud would perhaps have injured society had he, instead of finish- ing his last book, committed suicide to escape the pain of throat cancer. But surely there have been many suicides whose demise was not a notice- able loss to society; an honest man could only say that in some instances society was better off without them. It need not… [Content truncated to 3000 words]